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Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of industrial development using a coordination game. 
Complementarities between transport infrastructure provision by the Government and 
consumer goods manufacturing firms, and among consumer goods firms themselves dictate 
the outcome: either the transport infrastructure (i.e., a highway) is not built and firms keep 
doing “home” production, thus supplying mainly nearby consumers and dispensing with a 
highway; or they switch to “factory” production, a more spatially centralized regime, where 
output must be sold over long distances, thus implying the construction of a highway. 
In relation to the existent literature, this paper presents two main innovations. Firstly, the two 
sources of linkage, namely cost linkage, through the provision of an indivisible input (the 
highway), and demand linkage, through the wage rise brought about by industrialization, are 
not treated separately, but they are integrated in the same model. Consequently, the game 
has now two levels of equilibrium selection. Secondly, the paper does not limit itself to 
checking that there can arise multiple Nash equilibria under certain circumstances, but it 
discusses methods for the selection of a unique outcome. Consequently, in addition to the 
classical Nash equilibria mentioned above, there is a third possible solution where the 
Government builds the highway but the consumer goods firms refrain from using it and stick to 
“home” production. Hence, the transport infrastructure becomes a “white elephant”. 
Keywords:  Big Push, Coordination Games, Economic Development, Equilibrium selection, 
Industrialization. 
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The existence of multiple Nash equilibria has been regarded by game theorists in a twofold 
way. On the one hand, it is deemed as a problem, since it prevents the players from adhering 
to a unique solution for the game. With multiple equilibria, each player becomes uncertain 
about the strategy that will be chosen by the opponent, so that his move can lead him to an   
out of equilibrium situation. Hence, game theory has the task of supplying the players a 
process of selecting the “good” equilibrium and this process amounts to specify for each player 
a way to form robust expectations about the intentions of the other individuals. 
There are two fundamentally different ways of specifying for each player expectations of the 
intended actions of the opponents. Either the prescribed beliefs are endogenous to the 
mathematical structure of the game, i.e. they can be calculated by manipulating the numbers 
in a payoff matrix (this is the “risk dominance” approach by HARSANYI and SELTEN, 1988), or 
they are exogenous to it. In the latter case, expectations stem from the information implicit in 
the “labels” or “names” assigned to the players and strategies (this is the approach of the 
“focal points”, by SCHELLING, 1960). 
On the other hand, since a long time ago, multiplicity of equilibria has been considered as a 
positive feature: 
For a given society, a set of moves and patterns of behavior gradually 
build up and then remain stationary for long periods of time; yet, 
another society, with approximately similar initial conditions will evolve 
to a quite distinct pattern of cultural norms.  Loosely speaking, we may 
regard these as two possible equilibrium “solutions to this game”. (LUCE 
and RAIFFA, 1957). 
The process of industrialization is a natural field of application of “coordination games”, i.e. 
games that have at least two strict Nash equilibria. Industrialization concerns the transition by 
firms between two stages. In the first stage, production is carried out at a small scale, mainly 
close to household’s residence. Since productive activity is very evenly dispersed in space, 
most of the output is sold in the neighborhood of the firm, so that it does not require long 
distance transport. Furthermore, production occurs under constant returns to scale, unit 
production costs are fairly constant and one unit of labor is transformed in one unit of output. 
By contrast, in the second stage, production is made in large scale, usually in a factory located 
in an urban area. Production is much more concentrated in space, so that most of the output 
must be sent over long distances in order to be sold. Moreover, production works under 
increasing returns to scale, this meaning that unit production costs decrease with the amount 
of output produced (there are economies of scale). 
Although the word “industrial revolution” is usually associated with specific social 
experiments, such as the UK in the XVIII century or Korea and Japan in the XX century, there 
are many countries and regions that stay poor and stuck with traditional technologies and are 
thus prone to endure an industrialization process. Current “industrial revolutions” are taking 
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place in China and other East-Asian countries.  Furthermore, areas that were formerly 
industrialized and somehow lost their manufacturing basis, such as regions within the 
European Union, face the need to re-industrialize. Consequently, industrialization processes 
remain a very important context of economic development.  
The merit to have the intuition that the switch from traditional “home” technologies to 
modern “factory” is connected with some kind of coordination of investment decisions across 
industrial sectors belongs to P. N. ROSENSTEIN-RODAN (1943). The basic idea is that there are 
complementarities in the production of different manufactured goods. Hence, producing more 
of a given industrial good raises the profitability of expanding the output of other goods.  This 
complementarity arises either from increasing consumers’ demand and or decreasing 
production costs. 
The first model concerns complementarities in demand. The population in this area is 
exclusively composed by farmers who produce and consume raw food and materials (such as 
cotton) in the context of a “home production”.  A share of the population is underemployed in 
the sense that it can be withdrawn from agriculture without this shift causing a decrease of the 
agricultural output. 
Consider now the introduction of manufacturing in this area. For simplicity, assume that there 
are two kinds of transformed goods: processed food, produced through the transformation of 
raw food (through freezing, packaging, canning and so on); and other consumer goods, for 
instance clothing, through the transformation of cotton. Let us suppose furthermore that 
factories are located in a town, so that a worker must consume processed food that is 
transported from the countryside. Hence, factory workers spend their income into equal 
shares of “processed food” and “clothing”. The value added created by the factory is 
composed by 90% of wages and 10% of profits. 
Let us assume that a clothing firm invests in a factory employing one thousand workers.  The 
owners of capital live abroad and receive the profits in the form of exports of 10% of the 
“clothing” produced by the factory. These exports compensate the purchase or leasing of 
capital goods (machines) from abroad made by the factory. 
If the factory workers spent the whole of their wages in “clothing”, the firm’s output could be 
completely sold. As the expenditure shares in the two manufactured goods are 50-50, 45% of 
the production finds no buyer. However, if a second factory for processing food is created in 
the region employing also a thousand workers, according to the above line of reasoning, each 
firm will find enough demand to sell its output. That is to say, an isolated move by a firm in a 
sector will be unprofitable, whereas two coordinated investments will be profitable. The 
complementarities work as pecuniary externalities: they will not be felt by the firms, if they 
decide in isolation, but they will appear as profits in the balance sheets in the case that 
coordinate their undertakings. 
This kind of view of the industrialization process, known as “balanced growth” has been 
criticized on the ground that it implies a domestic market that is fairly closed to foreign trade 
through the imposition of tariffs and other trade restrictions. This assumption contradicts the 
evolution of the world economy towards a sharp decrease of transport costs, both of physical 
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outputs and information, and increasing trade integration at the regional and the multilateral 
levels. 
Although it is apparently well founded this criticism does not invalidate the adequacy of 
ROSENSTEIN-RODAN’s (1943) perspective of the industrialization process, on account of three 
factors. Firstly, balanced growth does not preclude foreign trade because a share of the output 
of consumer goods must be exported in order to pay for imported capital goods, such as 
machines. Secondly, although net exports are an important component of aggregate demand, 
a country or region only attracts increasing returns production if it has a large home market.  
Otherwise the geographical concentration of production following from strong scale 
economies will take place abroad and the domestic market will be supplied by means of 
imports. This is KRUGMAN’s (1980) well known Home Market effect. Finally “balanced growth” 
does not require very high explicit subsidies to domestic production, through tariffs or other 
kinds of protection, because it leads to a high degree of physical proximity between producers 
and consumers of each manufactured good. This strong closeness gives domestic production a 
competitive edge over imports that must be carried over long distances and generates 
“implicit subsidies” that substitute for explicit protectionist barriers. 
This observation is particularly important because the need for coordination among 
investments for the production of different consumer goods may stem from cost linkages 
rather than from reciprocal demand creation as it was described above. ROSENSTEIN-RODAN 
(1943) cited the example of a underground line to be built in the Greater London Area. If a 
standard cost-benefit analysis is performed, it can be concluded that the preexistent traffic is 
not sufficient to make the line profitable enough. However, if the growth of residences and 
shops and the rise of land values are taken into account, then building the underground line 
becomes a profitable undertaking.  It is also efficient provided that the movement of 
population towards the neighborhood of the new transport line does reduce aggregate income 
in the areas where the migrants come from. This condition is likely to be satisfied if the 
population density is high and there is a considerable set of currently underemployed workers. 
The importance of coordination of investments in complementary goods appears more clearly 
if we refer to economy with two consumptions goods, ” processed food” and “clothing”, each 
one accounting for one half of both consumer expenditure and labor force.  Suppose that the 
infrastructure is a highway. The producers of either good are users of the highway only if they 
select the modern, mass production technology, where production is concentrated in a single 
plant and a single location and the output must carried to the customers over long distances. 
By contrast, if is made by a large number set of small home units evenly dispersed in space, the 
highway is needless since the customers of each plant locate very close to it. 
We assume that the construction of the highway implies a fixed cost. Marginal running cost is 
zero for the sake of simplicity.  The highway can break even only if the two sectors (“processed 
food” and “clothing”) use mass production technologies that are concentrate in space. Then, 
we find again the previous situation. If both sectors industrialize, the highway is built and the 
economy suffers a development process. If only one sector switches to a modern technology, 




This latter instance of development through coordination of investment bears two major 
differences in relation to the former one. Firstly, complementarity between the two sectors 
does not follow from reciprocal demand creation, but rather from decreasing costs: the 
decision to use a modern technology by a firm makes infrastructure construction feasible and 
thus decreases the costs of switching to the modern technology for the other firm. Secondly, 
this kind of complementarity through decreasing costs dispenses with any kind of assumption 
of closure of the domestic economy to foreign trade. 
The paper by MURPHY et al. (1989) formalizes the two situations described in ROSENTEIN-
RODAN (1943), in terms of coordination games: games that have more than one strict Nash  
equilibrium.  They consider a large number of productive sectors, each sector being able to 
choose between a “home” traditional technology and a modern “factory” technology. The 
coordination situation arises when it is profitable for all sectors to switch technologies 
simultaneously, but each firm loses money if it attempts to modernize itself in isolation. 
MURPHY et al. (1989) were also careful do distinguish that a coordination game does not arise 
for every values of the game parameters. In the demand linkage model, there should be a 
positive wage premium in order to induce the worker to shift from “home” to the “factory” as 
a workplace. It is implicit that this shift causes a disutility for the worker. A share of this 
disutility corresponds to increased transport costs. Implicitly, the technology change is related 
with a move by the workers from the countryside to a town. Hence, workers are no longer able 
to raise a share of their food as they did before and become constrained to buy the whole of it. 
They have also to bear a transport cost on the food they consume from the countryside to the 
town. Urbanization also leads to housing expenditures that did not exist when workers lived in 
cottages scattered in the countryside. 
MURPHY et al. (1989) stressed that a coordination game arises for high enough values of the 
wage premium. Clearly, the reciprocal demand creation by two coordinated plants is directly 
proportional to the wage rise related with transition from home to factory technology. This 
mutual demand increase is correlated with size of the region where a game with two Nash 
equilibria emerges.          
Something analogous can be said about the conditions for a coordination game to hold for the 
cost linkage situation. Here the crucial parameter is the degree of use of the infrastructure 
associated with the density of population in area crossed by the highway. If the set of 
consumers that potentially use the highway are low, even a simultaneous technological move 
by all firms, may not allow the infrastructure to break even. If potentially users are plentiful, 
the infrastructure will always be built in equilibrium. A coordination game will emerge if the 
density of potential users is intermediate. 
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the modeling of economic development through a 
coordination game on two grounds. Firstly, while MURPHY et al. (1989) treat separately 
models with demand and cost linkages, we include both kinds of linkages in the game, making 
it more realistic and also in line with research in economic geography (such as KRUGMAN, 
1995). Secondly, we do not limit ourselves to check the existence of multiple Nash equilibria, 
but we try to assess how different ways of selecting a unique equilibrium lead to different 
outcomes of the game. 
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In particular, we remark that the two main procedures of selecting a unique equilibrium, 
namely the specification of “endogenous expectations” for the players through the 
manipulation of the payoff matrix (HARSANYI and SELTEN, 1988) and the setting of “exogenous 
expectations”, founded in the information implicit in the “labels” of players and strategies 
(SCHELLING, 1960) lead to opposed outcomes of the game. Furthermore, if “exogenous 
expectations” are used, very different solutions emerge if the player’s beliefs follow from a 
tacit “convention” or from pre-play communication. 
Basically, the infrastructure game in MURPHY et al. (1989) had two equilibria. Either all sectors 
switch simultaneously to the mass production technology and the transport infrastructure is 
built, or all firms stay in cottage production and the infrastructure is not built. Our model, by 
introducing different procedures of selecting a unique equilibrium, has a third feasible 
outcome, where the infrastructure is built but the industrial firms remain stuck in a backward 
technology. 
This last equilibrium is a very relevant tool for understanding the spatial evolution of the 
Portuguese economy 
In Portugal, since its adhesion to the European Economic Community, there has been a strong 
investment in highways. It is estimated that the average transport costs by road have fallen 
about by 45% between the provincial capitals (capitais de distrito) during the period 1985-
1998. The decline of transport costs should have been 42% approximately for the period 1998-
2010 (TEIXEIRA, 2006). 
The network of fast roads has covered the whole territory of Portugal in a comprehensive way, 
thus not limiting itself the regions of agglomeration of population and productive activity. 
Nevertheless, this infrastructure program did not lead to an industrialization surge, either at 
the national level, or at the local level. Manufacturing stagnated in Portugal from 1998 on and 
regional imbalances deepened during that period. Most highways became “white elephants”, 
particularly those that connect the more developed coastland with the deserted hinterland. 





2. The game 
 
We assume an economy that is described by a non- cooperative game whose rules are defined 
below. 
2.1. Description of the economy 
 
We assume an economy that is wide enough to allow for significant internal transportation 
and has enough population for firms to exploit economies of scale if they choose to do so. 
However, aggregate income is relatively low since the economy is underdeveloped. 
The population of consumers/workers is accounted for by a representative consumer that 
supplies a fixed amount of labor L to firms. The economy is made up by the production of two 
consumer goods: “food” and “other consumer goods” (that will be labeled henceforth as 
“clothing”). We name “food” as “good 1” and “clothing” as “good 2”. The utility function of the 
representative consumer is Cobb-Douglas with equal shares expenditure shares for each good: 
  
 ( ) 0.5 0.51 2 1 2,U C C C C=  (1) 









= =  (2)  
Here y stands for consumer income. 
We account for the underdevelopment of the area by saying that each consumer good is 
produced by a fringe of competitive firms, that use a “home” or “traditional” technology of 
constant returns to scale, where one unit of labor is transformed into one unit of output 
(either “food” or “clothing”). It is assumed that, in this case, the wage is the numéraire of the 
economy, so that the competitive price of both goods is 1. This economy has no roads or other 
transport infrastructures: goods are carried at a high cost either by land on horseback, or 
through water by boat. Hence, unit transport costs are high. As production does not entail 
scale economies, production is evenly distributed across space, in order to achieve proximity 
among the seller and its buyers. 
We can alternatively regard this traditional economy as being made up by a set of farms, 
where each farm self-produces and self-consumes both “food” and “clothing”, with no need to 
engage in market transactions or in transportation of goods. 
Then, the main features of economic development are introduced. The feature is the existence 
of a “Government” that rules this area and has the mission to build a transport infrastructure 
(highway) serving each region within the area. The cost to build the highway is entirely fixed 
and given by R units of labor. 
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In each productive sector, in addition to the competitive fringe of small firms, there is a firm 
that as the option to switch to a “modern” technology and become a monopolist in it sector. 
The main feature of this “modern” is the rise of labor productivity. Instead of transforming an 
input into output according to a “one-to-one” ratio, the firm now processes one unit of labor 
into 1α > units of output. 
The “modern” technology is more productive because it manufactures higher quality goods, 
with a high value per unit of weight. Consequently, these new products are somehow “lighter” 
and easier to ship, thus leading to an expansion of the market for the consumer good. But, for 
the market expansion to take place, it is necessary that a transport infrastructure has been 
previously set up and connects buyers and sellers over long distances. We assume that, if an 
industrial sector switches to the “modern” technology, it is willing to pay a toll just above one-
half of the construction cost,  
2
R
ε+ , where ε  is positive and arbitrarily small. 
If a firm switches to the “modern” technology, its price remains unchanged at the unit level. As 
a matter of fact, the firm cannot raise its price above 1, since it would lose all its customers to 
the competitive fringe. Moreover it does not pay off to decrease the price below 1, since it 
faces a demand curve with unit price elasticity. 
The transition from a “traditional” technology to a “modern” one, implies that the wage is 
raised from 1 to w where 
 1 , 0w v v= + >  (3) 
This raise has to do with the fact that the worker shifts from a rural location to an urban one. 
With this shift, his living cost rises because: 
1. He has to buy food, which was formerly self-produced in the farm where he lived. 
2. As the worker now lives in a town, food must be transported between the places 
of production and consumption.  
3. The displacement creates the need to find a new home, which must be paid for. 
The main idea is that the wage increase due to industrialization, expressed in equation (3), 
does not increase the utility obtained by the representative consumer, whose utility function 
becomes 
 ( ) 0.5 0.51 2 1 2,U C C C C v= −  (4) 
  








2.2. The rules of the game. 
We now try to give a formal account of the working of this economy through a non-
cooperative game. 
This game has three players, each one being endowed with a choice set of two actions: 
• Government, labeled as “G”, that can either “Build” or “Not Build” a transport 
infrastructure. 
• Firm 1, producing “food”, that can either select a “traditional” technology (producing 
“raw food”); or a “modern” technology (producing “processed” food). 
• Firm 2, producing “clothing”, that can either choose a “traditional” technology 
(spinning and weaving at home);  or a ”modern” technology (producing cloth in a 
factory). 
 






















The payoffs will be written as the triplet (Government, Firm 1, Firm 2). If the Government 
chooses to “do nothing”), payoffs are ( )0,0,0 , since the firms will be constrained to use 
traditional technologies under perfect competition, thus leading to a zero profit. 
Instead, if the Government decides to build the highway, a proper subgame is started with the 
decision by Firm 1. 
 
Since this subgame is static, it can represented in the normal form. In the following matrix, the 
payoffs have the following meaning: 
• 
ij




a is the payoff of Firm 1, when it selects action i  and Firm 2 selects action j . 
• 
ij
b  is the payoff of Firm 2, when Firm 1 selects move i  and Firm 2 chooses action j . 
• 0 is the payoff of a firm that chooses to employ a “traditional” technology.  
The payoff matrix is 
  
 




Firm 1 Modern , , , ,0
Traditional ,0, ,0,0




In order to set the Government’s payoffs, we must take into account  that it supplies a 
transport infrastructure (a highway, for instance) with a fixed construction cost Rw ,  that for 
simplicity is identical to the total cost – variable costs are supposed  to be zero.  R stands for a 
fixed amount of labor, while w is the wage rate under the “modern” technology. The 
Government charges to each using firm a toll 
2
Rw
ε+ , where ε  is positive and arbitrarily 
small. 
The “modern” technology leads the firm to concentrate the productive activity in few sites and 
to use the transport infrastructure to distribute the product. By contrast, the “traditional” 
technology entails the dispersion of productive activity in space and its closeness to customers, 
thus making the transport technology almost needless. 




 11 2 2 0
2
Rw
g Rwε ε ε
 
= + − = ≈ > 
 
  
 21 12 0
2 2 2
Rw Rw Rw
g g Rwε ε
 
= = + − = − + ≈ − < 
 
 (6) 
 22 0g Rw= − <   
If we set the Government’s payoffs fixed, we can write the subgame in normal form with the 












It is also clear that his is a 2 2×  symmetric game, where: 
 11 11a b=  
 12 21a b=  
Hence, the payoff matrix of a single player (player Firm 1, w.l.g.) contains all the relevant 









Now we will determine the values of payoffs in Table (8). 
 
2.2.1. Consumer good firm profit when both firms adopt modern technologies    
 
The income of the representative consumer is 
 ( )2 1y L vπ= + +  (9) 









= − − +  







 is the unit variable cost of a “modern” firm with labor productivity 1α >  that pays a 
wage 1w v= + . 







=  (11) 
By substituting (11) in (10),  we get 
 
( ) ( )1 11
1
2 2 2
y L v R vv y
α
− + ++ 
≈ − − 
 
 (12) 
By solving (12) in relation to y , we have: 
 ( )y L Rα= −  (13) 
By substituting (13) in (11), we obtain each firm’s profit, equivalent to payoff 11a  in Table  (8) 
 
( ) ( )1
2
L R L vα
π
− − +
=  (14) 
 
2.2.2. A “modern” firm’s profit when the other firm sticks to “traditional” 
technology. 
 
We now try to find the exact value of payoff 12a  in Table (8). We use the symbol 1w v= + , 
where w stands for the wage in the modern sector. Then, the representative consumer works 
50-50 in the “modern” plant, where he is paid  wage w , and in the “traditional” sector where 
he receives a unit wage. It should also be remarked that only a firm makes positive profits, 





y wπ= + +  (15) 







≈ − − 
 
 (16) 




y wπ = − +  (17) 
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Substituting (17) in (16), we obtain 
 ( )1 1
2 2 2




− + ≈ − − 
 
 





























The payoff matrix of Firm 1 in the symmetric 2 2×  subgame can be written as: 
 




Firm 1 Modern 1
2 2
Traditional 0 0





− − + −




2.3. Set of Nash equilibria in the subgame 
 
If 12a−  is added to second column of matrix (20), the set of Nash equilibria of the subgame 








































≈ >  





















2. ( ) 0 1L v v α> ⇔ < − . This condition is met by assumption. 
3. ( ) ( ) when 1L v v α−→ +∞ → −  
4. ( ) ( ) ( ) is increasing and convex: 0, 0L v L v L v′ ′′> >  
 
  
















Which is equivalent to 
 ( )
( )










− − +  
 (23) 










2. ( ) ( ) when 1L v v α−→ +∞ → −  
3. ( ) 0 iff 1L v vα> − > , this condition being met by assumption. 
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4. ( ) ( ) is increasing: 0L v L v′ > . 
 
It is easy to show that the difference ( ) ( )L L v L v∆ ≡ − is positive and monotonically 
increasing with v , if ( )0, 1v α∈ − : 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )1 2
L
Rv




∆ ≡ − =
− − +  
 (24) 









   
  
   
  
   
   





   
 
Figure 1: Regions of Nash equilibrium in ( ),v L space 
( )L v  
( )L v  








1 20, 0a a> <  
1 20, 0a a< >  




   
  
 
   
The region where there are two Nash equilibria is comprised between curves ( ) ( ) and L v L v . 
In this region, the two consumer good firms may either agree on using traditional technologies 
and selling to nearby consumers or, through a Big Push, switch to modern technologies and 
distribute their outputs to customers over long distances using a highway. 
In the intermediate region, the subgame is a unanimity game whose strict equilibria are  
 ( ) ( ){ }Modern,Modern , Traditional,Traditional  
It is easy to assess that the former equilibrium dominates the latter in payoffs. Clearly, 1 2a a>
is equivalent to 
  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1
2 2








By solving inequality (25) in relation to L , we get the result 
 ( )
( )










− − + +  
 (26) 
Comparing (26) and (22), we conclude that for ( )0, 1v α∈ − , the following inequality holds: 
 ( ) ( )*L v L v<  (27) 
Consequently, in the two equilibrium region, the “modern” equilibrium Pareto dominates the 
“traditional” outcome. 
 
2.4. Equilibrium selection and the solution of the game. 
 
HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988) defend that, in a game with multiple Nash equilibria, finding the 
solution may proceed by decomposing the game into parts (typically, subgames or 
truncations). The equilibrium of each part should be found and substituted for in the overall 
game in a way that reminds the determination of a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
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Hence, we should begin to select a Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous subgame, i.e., to 
specify for each player a belief or expectation about the strategies that the opponents may 
select. There are two contrasting methods for making this kind of belief specification: either  
the players use endogenous or make exogenous expectations. 
 
2.4.1. Endogenous expectations: selecting  equilibrium through “risk 
dominance”. 
 
HARSANYI and SELTEN (1988) proposed a method for selecting an equilibrium that uses only 
the rationality and common knowledge of the payoff matrix by each player. Hence, only the 
mathematical structure of the game is used to compute the unique Nash equilibrium. Their 
solution, widely known as “risk dominant”, implies that each player uses the pure strategy that 
is supported by the widest set of beliefs he may have about the strategies the other players 
will select. 
In a symmetric unanimity game, such as the subgame in this paper, the “risk dominant” 
equilibrium is coincident with the Pareto or payoff dominant equilibrium, that is, the Nash 
equilibrium ( )Modern, Modern . 
If we make this kind of selection for the subgame, it is clear that the Government chooses to 
supply the highway, with a payoff 0ε > , whereas he gets 0 if he does nothing. Hence, the 
unique Nash equilibrium is 
 ( )Supply highway, Modern, Modern  (28) 
The payoffs associated with this equilibrium are:  ( )11 11, ,a aε . 
 
2.4.2. Exogenous expectations: selecting  equilibrium according  either a 
“convention” or pre-play communication. 
 
According to SCHELLING (1960), in a coordination game, expectations of each player about the 
decisions of the opponents should be specified using the information that is implicit in 
“names” or “labels” that are assigned either to players or strategies. 
If there is no pre-play communication, the players’ beliefs coordinate around a “focal point” or 
“tacit convention”, which may be different from the Pareto dominant equilibrium. In this 
game, the economy is underdeveloped in the first place, so that the firms start using the 
“traditional” technology. It can happen that his status quo ante makes a “tacit convention” for 
producing in the economy, even if it is not socially efficient. 
HIRSCHMAN (1958) argued that coordination through pre-play communication would not be 
feasible in a generalized scale in an underdeveloped economy, whose most scarce resource is 
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precisely the ability to plan and undertake joint several related investment projects. Hence, he 
defended that the investment game should not be regarded as simultaneous with multiple 
equilibria, but rather as pure sequential game where each player is endowed with perfect 
situation. This view would lead to the same solution as in (28). However, it is well known that 
this is not the only possible outcome of the overall game. 
FARRELL and SHAPIRO (1996) argue that the HIRSCHMAN (1958)’s objection is founded if firms 
are concerned with communication forms such as “signaling”, where the transmission of 
information is directly related with a cost to be supported by the signal sender. By contrast, 
there are forms of communication, usually known as “cheap talk”, that do neither affect 
directly the sender’s payoff, nor constrain his behavior afterwards. 
“Cheap talk” is not always an efficient mean for selecting a Nash and Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium in a coordination. But in the case of this subgame, since the preferences of the 
firms are perfectly aligned, it is indeed efficient. As FARRELL and SHAPIRO (1996) argue, here 
each sent message, has two essential properties: 
1. It is “self-signaling”: If a player says “I will use a modern technology”, he is actually 
intending to use this kind of technology and he wants the other firm to believe him. 
2. It is “self-commiting”: If the other firm believes the message, it will also use the 
“modern” technology. Then, as ( )Modern, Modern  is a Nash equilibrium, the sender 
has indeed an interest to stick to initial proclaimed intention. 
 
The efficiency of “cheap talk” may not be generalizable to coordination games with a higher 
number of players. HUYCK et al. (1990), also mentioned in COOPER (1999), show that, in a 
repeated coordination game with several Pareto-ranked equilibria, the payoff dominant 
equilibrium is the result if there are only two players. However, if the number of players is 
increased, the solution switches to the “worst but safe” equilibrium. Something similar should 
happen in pure coordination games with pre-play communication. 
 
2.5. Selection of a unique Nash equilibrium: discussion 
 
Hence, it is not easy to select an equilibrium for the subgame, with a consequence that, in 
addition to equilibrium (28), we have the equilibrium: 
 ( )Do nothing, traditional, traditional  (29) 
with payoffs ( )0,0,0 . 
Furthermore, there is an equilibrium following from the fact that the Government forecasts 
that the firms will invest in “modern” technologies, whereas the firms by “tacit convention” 
remain stuck in traditional ones. Formally, the equilibrium is 
 ( )Supply highway, traditional, traditional  (30) 




The three possible Nash equilibria are Pareto ranked in the following way: equilibrium (28) 
dominates equilibrium (29), which in turn dominates equilibrium (30). 
The evolution of Southern European countries, such as Portugal, seems to conform itself with 
the “worst” equilibrium. A dense network of highways was built in Portugal with the help of 
European Funds, not limiting itself to the areas with denser productive activity but covering 
the whole territory. However, most of the high speed roads are nowadays “white elephants”, 
with a low rate of use by both cars and lorries. 
The economic consequences of this outcome are harmful to the Portuguese economy. Most of 
the inputs necessary to build the highways (both intermediate goods and consumer goods to 
keep the workers employed in their construction) were imported. Moreover, the consumer 
good firms failed to industrialize, that is, to switch to more spatially concentrated technologies 
that could increase productivity and enable them to sell over long distances and achieve 
exports. Hence, the highway program contributed heavily to the trade deficit problem, which 
is being redressed only now. 
Why did this unfortunate outcome take place? Several explanations are in order: 
1. The highway program was too ambitious and too expensive, so that the demand for 
transport services did not match the increase of their supply. Eventually, as the costs 
soared, tolls had to be raised to a high level thus discouraging consumers to use them. 
2. Paradoxically, the arise of European Internal Market decreased the size of the market 
addressed to manufacturing goods producers in the Southern European periphery, 
because it came along with the sudden and unexpected admission of the competing 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This was aggravated by trade liberalization in 
the context of the World Trade Organization, thus giving access to the internal market 
to countries endowed with huge domestic markets, such as China. 
3. The mechanism of industrial planning during the period of Estado Novo (the so-called 
Planos de Fomento) was dismantled following the coming of political democracy in 
April 1974. The mechanisms for coordinating industrial investments by the Public 
Administration were dismantled and were eventually replaced by a mere supervision 
exerted by banks, whose perspective was not centered on the group of firms as whole 





3. Concluding  remarks 
 
Using a coordination game to model the possible industrialization of a backward economy 
allows us to consider two opposite outcomes: either transport infrastructures are built by the 
Government and the production of consumer goods becomes industrialized, that is, the firms 
adopt “mass production” technologies that enable them to sell over long distances; or the 
Government does nothing and firms are constrained to do “home production” and sell to 
consumers located in its neighborhood. 
The working of this coordination game is founded on two kinds of complementarities across 
consumer good firms. Firstly, we have demand complementarities. If a firm invests in a factory, 
the wages of the workers are raised in relation to the level they had under the “home” 
production. This expands the demand for the products delivered by the other industrial firms. 
Then, we have cost complementarities. If the firms use a fixed input (an infrastructure), the 
investment by a firm helps the infrastructure to break even and facilitates the investment by 
other using firms. Usually, these two kinds of linkages (demand or cost) are modeled 
separately. 
The novelty of this paper lies in the integration of demand and cost linkages in the same 
model. Hence, we have two different sources of multiplicity of Nash equilibria, instead of just 
one. Moreover, we do not limit ourselves to check the existence of multiple equilibria, but we 
try instead to discuss the methods for selecting the “good” Nash equilibrium. 
In addition to the well-known outcomes of stagnation (no infrastructure, the firms use 
“traditional” technologies) and industrialization (infrastructure is built and firms switch to 
“modern” technologies), we have a third possible result, where the Government provides the 
infrastructure but the firms refrain from investing and using the highway, which consequently 
becomes a “white elephant”. 
This latter situation seems to characterize a share of the highways that were built in Portugal 
recently aided by European Funds. The factors for this sad outcome concern both the 
European Union (that has given free access to the Internal European Market to tough 
competitors from outside) and the country (that has over-invested in highways and dismantled 
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